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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
) 
ROSETTA STONE LTD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. 09-736 
) 
VS. ) September 
) 
GOOGLE, INC. , ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
BEFORE, 
APPEARANCES, 
) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
MOTIONS HEARING 
THE HONORABuE GERALD BRUCE LEE 
UNITED STATES 'DISTRICT JUDGE 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 
BY, TERENCE P. ROSS, ESQ. 
18, 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, ODIN FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, PC 
2009 
BY, JONATHAN DAVID FRIEDEN, ESQ. 
1 
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES 
BY, MARGRET MARY C~RUSO, ESQ. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON,RMR, CRR 
U.S. District Court 
401 courthouse Square, 5th Floor 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
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1 (Thereupon, the following was heard in open 
2 court at 12:32 p .m .) 
3 THE CLERK: 1:09 civil 736, Rosetta Stone, 
4 LTD versus Google, Incorporated. 
5 MR. ROSS: Good morning, Your Honor. 
6 Ter rance Ross for the plaintiff, Rosetta Stone, Limited . 
7 
S 
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr . Ross. 
MR. FRIEDEN : Good morning, Your Honor . 
9 John Frieden for the defendant, Google . 
3 
10 It 's my pleasure to introduce Margret Caruso 
11 who is admi tted pro hac vice in this action. 
12 THE COURT: . Good afternoon. 
MS. CARUSO: Good afternoon. 
THE COURT: I'm ready. 
13 
14 
15 MS. CARUSO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
16 t-1argret Caruso for the defendant t C-oogle. Inc . 
17 We 1 re here on Google's motion to dismiss 
IS Rosetta Stone's complaint. The primary basis for the 
19 motion is the party forum selection clause. 
20 This forum selection clause is veLY plain 
21 language, and it requires that all claims relating to 
22 Google's programs, defined as Google's advertising 
23 programs. nbe litigated exclusively in the federal or 
2 4 state courts of Santa Clara County, California , USA". 
25 Unlike the earlier forum selection clause, 
RENECIA A"" SMITH - WILSON, RMR, eRR 
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1 there is no mention here in the clause between exclusively 
2 and the feder al state courts. It's simply right there. 
3 It applies to all claims relating to Google programs. 
4 And the plaintiff, RQsetta Stone, has not 
5 contested that its complaint relates to Google's 
6 advertising programs. 
7 What they've tried to do. instead, is a 
8 those words or the Google programs don't have meaning. 
9 They don't add anything at all to t he forum selection 
10 clause. The forum selection clause ~imply applies to the 
11 agreement of the parties. 
12 That, of course, as contrary to basic 
13 principles of contract interpretation vlhich all words of 
14 the contract have meaning and they're not ·superfluous 
IS words, that all the words _have to be accredited here. And 
I. 
16 the explanation that Rosetta Stone offers does not give 
17 any meaning to those words. 
18 THE COURT: So does a conspiracy claim 
19 against Google l is that encompassed in the forum selectlon 
20 clause if it involves t hird party? 
21 t-1S. CAI~.uSO : Yes, Your Honor, it is because 
based entirely on Google's advertising programs. 
22 the only defendant here is Google. And that claim is I; 
23 
24 All the allegations in the c omplaint are 
25 directed to actions that are taken in connection '(lith 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, eRR 
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1 third parties advertising through Google AdWords program. 
2 THE COURT: The plaintiff's claim here 
3 involves trademark infringement . Is it your view that 
4 because the trademark infringement asserted has to do with 
5 Google's website that that would encompass the forum 
6 selection clause? 
7 MS. CARUSO: Yes, Your Honor, but more 
8 particularly every allegation of trademark infringement is 
9 based on the Google AdWords program and the operation of 
10 Google AdWords program. 
11 So because that is -- it 'S not because the 
12 Ad\,lords program is a covered Google program under this 
13 clause, yes, it relates to this clause and is covered by 
14 it. 
15 THE COURT : Well, help me with the -- your 
16 view of the clause is really straightforward. Anything 
17 that any lawsuit that a client of Google wants to bring 
18 has to be brought in California under the forum selection 
19 clause; is that right? 
20 MS. CARUSO, Any claim that relates to the 
21 Google advertising programs that's brought by a customer 
22 of the Google advertising programs, yes. 
23 THE COURT: And you already said trademark 
24 infringement is encompassed in t hat. 
25 MS. CARUSO : Yes, as alleged in Rosetta 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON. RMR, eRR 
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1 St one ' s complaint. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. \olell, i f you would 
) address the issue of the false endorsement claim. 
4 MS. CARUSO: Yes, Your Honor. This claim as 
5 under t he Lanham Act, and as Rosetta Stone admits in the 
6 false endorsement claim what matters is whether or not 
7 there's a perception that the plaintiff endorses the 
8 defendant the defendant's products. 
9 And, uniformly, you loOk at those cases and 
1 0 any other false endorsement cases, they ' re all about 
11 "'Thether the plaintiff is endorsing the defendant. 
12 And. Rosetta Stone has not alleged that . 
13 TheY ' ve alleged that there is - - the public is under the 
14 rnisimpression ~hat Rosetta Stone endorses third parties , 
15 not the defendant. 
16 And that's a critical distinction for the 
17 language of the Lanham Act and all of the cases construing 
18 it in false endorsement claims. 
19 THE COURT: Does the Lanham Act require that 
20 the parties be competitors? 
21 14S. CARUSO: No I Your Honor, not for 
22 purposes of a false -- false endorsement claim. That 
23 in our opening brief, we were not sure exactly what the 
24 contours of their allegations were so we addressed all the 
25 various theories that section of the Lanham Act. And 
RENBCIA A. SMITH· WILSON, RMR. eRR 
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1 false advertising claims require competitors. but most --
2 any other claim filing under that section of the L~nham 
3 Act does not. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. And, would the conspiracy 
5 claim be barred by the Communications Decency Act because 
6 Google is an information content provider? 
7 MS. CARUSO: We believe that Google is not 
S an information content provider under the CDA. Instead, 
9 Google is solely a provider of an interactive computer 
10 service. 
11 Google has been held in numerous cases to be 
12 a provider of interactive computer services, and there 
13 arenlt any cases that hold the kind of activi ties alleged 
14 in Rosetta Stonels complaint constitute activities that 
15 give rise to an information content provider. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MS. CARUSO: If Your Honor would like, I can 
18 go through some of the cases that they cited and highlight 
19 how different those facts are from the ones we have here. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that that's 
21 necessary. and I have received your reply brief. 
22 I've focused on the questions that I want to 
23 ask you at the outset. 
24 Let me hear from Mr. Ross and 1111 give yOll 
25 a chance to respond. 
RENECIA A. SMITrI- WILSON, RMR. eRR 
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1 MS. CARUSO, Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT, I'm sorry. I should ask you if 
3 there's something else you felt you wanted to say that you 
4 weren't given a chance to say right now. 
5 MS . CARUSO, If there's anything else 
6 remaining at the end. 
7 THE COURT, Okay, all right. 
8 MR. ROSS, Your Honor, I think this is a 
9 fairly straightforward contract interpretation issue as 
10 presented to the Court here. 
11 THE COURT : Ilve been told that many times 
1 2 today. 
13 MR. ROSS: Yes. I couldn't believe when I 
14 heard t.he firs.t case. It was a forum selection clause. 
15 That's an incredible coincidence. 
16 THE " COURT: What are the chances that would 
17 happen twice in the same docket. I understand. 
18 MR. ROSS: lIve practice 20 years and I've 
19 only had a couple of these and now two on the same docket . 
20 Your Honor, the very first rule of contract 
21 interpretation. all that ' s required day one in contracts 
22 is that every part, every provision, every clause of the 
23 contract has to be given meaning . You don't read any out. 
24 ~~d the fundamental argument that Google is 
25 making here i s you have to ignore the preamble. 
RENECIA A. SMITH~WILSON, Rl1R, eRR 
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1 Now, there's actually a way to do that. 
2 I've drafted clauses like that. You put it towards the 
3 end of the contract and you say all the captions in the 
4 foregoing sections and the whereas clauses are not to be 
5 used in interpreting contract. 
6 There is no such provision here. And that's 
7 a noticeable absence. And without such a provision, this 
8 Court has to interpret this contract to give meaning to 
9 that second sentence which Ms. Caruso so studiously 
10 ignores. 
11 And that second sentence says, IIthese terms ll 
12 and the forum selection clause is one of "these terms 
13 govern customer's participation in Google advertising 
14 programs lI • Cust.omer's participation, meaning Rosetta 
15 Stone. 
16 And so the forum selection clause must be 
17 interpreted in light of that second sentence of the 
18 preamble. The forum selection clause must be understood 
19 to mean that claims arising out of the contract or 
20 relating to Rosetta Stone 's participation in the Google 
21 program must be pro 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT; ~lhere are you reading [rom? 
J~R _ ROSS, Your Honor 
THE COURT, Is that tab one of your 
11R. ROSS, Do you have the Google 
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1 advertising contract in front of you? 
2 THE COURT: I have tab one, the terms and 
3 conditions of Adwords select advertising program. 
4 MR. ROSS: If you look at the very opening 
5 brief of Google's, Your Honor, there ' s an affidavit at I:he 
6 back of that brief 
7 THE COURT~ Oh, I see it . 
8 MR . ROSS: Exhibit A. 
9 THE COURT: I have it. Hold on. I have it 
10 here. okay. I see it.. I see .it. 
11 MR. ROSS: So you see there on that very 
12 second sentence --
13 THE COURT: Right. 
14 MR. ROSS: Because fundamentally, what is 
15 the contract about? The sec.ond primary rule of contract 
16 interpretation is we look to interpret provisions of the 
17 contract as a whole. 
18 What is this contract about? Well, the 
19 second sentence tells us it"I"S about advertising by Rosetta 
20 on the Google'g network. But if you read every other 
21 section of this contract. iL is all about· what Rosetta 
22 Stone does to advertise with Google_ 
23 It's nothing about third party. It imposes 
24 a bQ~ch of requirements on Rosetta Stone for advertising 
25 with Google_ And so when we get to this forum selection 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, ru-1R, eRR 
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1 clause at the very end, applying the two fundamental rules 
2 of contract interpretation, how -- we got to make sure we 
3 give every clause meaning and we look at a contract as a 
4 whole. We have no choice but to conclude that the claims 
5 that have to be sent to Santa Clara County are claims that 
6 deal with breach of contract, breach of this contract, or 
7 that relate to Rosetta Stone's participation, i.e., 
a advertising on Google~ 
9 Now, Ms. Caruso said well, that would give 
10 no meaning to this word, the second part of the forum 
11 selection clause claims or claims arising out of the 
12 program. That's not true. 
13 There could be lot of claims that don't 
14 involve a breach of contract by Rosetta Stone that would 
15 have to go out to California . 
16 IIIl give you an example, Your Honor. 
17 There's nothing in the contract that says you , Rosetta 
18 Stone, don't put any viruses on our Google network when 
29 you ·advertise with us . 
20 So if we did, if Rosetta Stone put a virus 
21 on the Google's network, it could not bring a breach of 
22 contract claim that would have to go out to California . 
23 But it could bring a tort claim against us, and that would 
24 have tp go out to California. 
25 So the clause she's planning on does have 
RENEClA A. SMITH-WILSON. Rf.m.. eRR 
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1 meaning when you use our interpretation which of course is 
2 limited to Rosetta Stone's participation in this 
3 advertising. 
4 And of course, Your Honor. this is dr.afted· 
5 by Google. and the uniform rule in all the circuit courts 
6 is t.hat if a forum selection clause, if there'.s any doubt 
7 or uncertainty as to what it should mean or how it should 
8 apply, then it's not enforced . Uniform rule of all the 
9 circuits. 
I · 
10 So that f s our argument wi.th respect to forum 
11 selection clause unless you have other questions. 
12 THE COURT, well, the claims that are 
13 brought here don't necessarily turn on the contractual 
· l 4 relationship b~tween Google and Rosetta Stone. Trademark 
I 15 infringement claims can be -brought in any event against 
I , ~ 
16 Google or any others that infringe the trademark. 
17 MR. ROSS: That's correct, Your Honor . And 
18 you obviously have in mind the case that's not before the 
19 Fourth Circuit because we haven't dealt with this l but 
20 other circuits said the only time you use these forum 
21 selection c lause but not on breach of contract cases is 
22 when they somehow revolve around this contract or they I 
I: 
23 somehow require interpretation of contract , for example, 
24 Manetti case in the Ninth Circuit. 
25 Your Honor is absolutely right. We -- these 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, eRR 
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1 claims have absolutely nothing to do with our advertising 
2 on their system or this contract. You're right. 
3 THE COURT: well, as it relates to this 
4 lawsuit here, the claim of Rosetta Stone is all about wha~ 
5 appears on the Google ads and the Google website, isn't 
6 it? 
MR. ROSS: That's true. And we 7 
8 THE CQURT= Doesn't that relate to Google's 
9 advertising program? 
10 MR. ROSS: NO, Your Honor, because the 
11 contract here is dealing exclusively with Rosetta Stone's 
12 advertising on that network. 
13 We aren1t complaining in the underlying 
14 lawsuit that we "did anything wrong or that we committed 
15 trademark violation. Welre saying some third party did 
16 that, and therefore, it has nothing to do with this 
17 contract. 
18 In our lawsuit, this contract will never be 
1.9 entere.d into evidence, talked about, testified to by us or 
20 by Google because it's completely irrelevant to those 
21 third party trademark .suits. It's limited to Rosetta 
22 Stone's advertising of the network. 
23 THE COURT: But, "hen you say third party 
24 trademark suits, what you1re really complaining of is the 
25 display of an ad for a so-called sponsored link that might 
RENEC~A A. SMITH-WILSON. RMR. eRR 
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1 refer to another corporation or a competitor of Rosetta 
2 Stone; is that right? 
3 MR. ROSS: Yes. Your Honor. There are ads 
4 that Rosetta Stone has nothing to do with them. They ar~ 
5 being brought - - they are ads by some third party 
6 completely unrelated to Rosetta Stone or our contract with 
7 Google. 
8 THE COURT, Those third parties are not 
9 before the Court. So, for eXample, if there is some 
10 company called, you know, Lan~age, Inc, that you think is 
11 using Rosetta Stone's mark in the similar fashion because 
12 they have authorized "Google to present an ad for Language, 
13 Inc on their website. you have not brought them into this 
14 suit. have you-? 
15 MR. ROSS, You're absolutely right . We have 
16 not and we are not required to under the Lanham Act. We 
17 could have brought if we wanted to a direct claim for a 
18 claim for direct trademark infringement against them. 
19 But. why? They would just change the'i'r name and morph 
20 into something else. 
21 The only way to stop this sort of conduct is 
22 to bring it against the party that's facilitating and 
23 making it possible and that's Google_ And the Lanham Act 
24 clearly allows that- No dispute here . They have not 
25 moved to dismiss our trademark claims. 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON. RMR, eRR 
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1 THE COURT, Let's turn to the conspiracy 
2 claim and the issue of whether Google is an interactive 
3 computer service provider rather than an information 
4 content provider under the CDA. 
5 MR. ROSS: Your Honor, there's absolutely no 
6 doubt tha t t hey're an interactive computer system. That's 
7 only one of the three prongs that they have to fulfill. 
8 We're arguing the other two prongs which is 
9 that they a re an infor.mation conte nt provider and this is 
10 not Speech Online. Let me dear with Speech online first. 
What's happening -- what their claim 
12 fundamentally is -- ther~ ar~ permutations of it. But we, 
13 Rosetta Stone, have people out ther~ who are called 
14 resellers. We -have contracts with them. They're 
15 authorized to sell our proQuet. They're not authorized to 
16 put ads on the Google network. The contract says that. 
17 You can't use our trademark in that context. 
18 Google is going to them and saying. hey. 
19 come put an ad on our network. notwithstanding that 
20 contract . 
21 THE COURT: so, induce them to breach their 
22 contract with Rosetta Stone? 
23 MR. ROSS: They're conspiring, yes. And 
24 that has nothing to do about online speech. That ' s a 
25 completely offline activity. 
RENECIA A . SMITH ·iolILSON, RMR, CRR 
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And the CDA, the i mmunity for the CDA which 
is originally passed, for AOLs of the world service 
providers, is all about online speech. It's not about 
this offline conduct. And that's what that claim is 
about, and therefore it's not encompassed . 
Now the second argument we make is that t hey 
are also considered for purposes of the CDA information 
content provider. And specifically because it's a 
12 (b) (6) motion, if you look at paragraph 57 of our 
complaint we expressly said t hQt they create content. And 
that's the definition of an information content provider 
under the CDA. 
displaying 
THE COURT: They create content by 
creating the writing or the graphics that 
appears on the sponsored links on their website. 
MR. ROSS, Yes, sir. And they say t hat 
they're more like editors of a newspaper. They ' re 
neutral. They're just providing some, you know, editorial 
discretion. And that's not true. 
If you wanted to advertise on Google, you 
would have to have the words sponsored link on your ad. 
Even if you thought that was misleading and want to say 
this is a paid advertisement, they make you put the word 
sponsored link. 
THE COURT, That leads to another question. 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR . CRR 
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1 What does sponsored link means to you? Is there consumer 
2 confusion about what a sponsored link is? 
3 MR. ROSS: That's part of the case, yes, 
4 Your Honor. So part of the cqnfusion they're responsible 
5 for and therefore they're creating content and therefore 
6 they don't get the immunity of the CDA. 
7 Does that make - - does that make sense to 
8 you, Your Honor~ because I can elaborate some more. 
9 Here's --
1.0 THE COURT: I think that I understand what 
11 you're saying. You1re saying that to the ext.ent that 
12 Google creates the ad- that is displayed on their website, 
1.3 even if the information is supplied by the client, they 
14 are a content provider. 
1.5 MR. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. Now, there are 
16 a couple of cases that they cite in their brief , correctly 
17 cite that say if somehow you're doing that in a neutral 
18 manner . you know, that the final decision -- here is the 
19 way it's exp·ressed - - the final decision is with the 
20 advertising customer. 
21 You suggest to them, oh, why don't you 
22 brighten this ad up. You'd get more business~ But it's a 
23 suggestion. They have the final decision. 
24 Then you don't become an information content 
25 provider. What I'm saying to you is that's not the case. 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON . RMR. eRR 
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1 It's not a suggestion. You have to use their term 
2 sponsored link. You have to have the ad ei ther at the t op 
3 o r the side. You have to have that little blue 
4 yellow nO"l, yellow background coloring. Those are all 
5 things they make you do. It's not a suggestion like the 
6 cases they cite. And therefore, they're an information 
7 content provider within the unique definit ion of CDA. 
8 THE COURT, Have you set forth a false 
9 endorsement claim here? 
10 MR. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And 1 ' m focused more 
12 specifically on the i£sue of the likelihood of confusion 
13 as to the source or origin of the goods or services. What 
14 does sponsored _mean to you? 
15 MR. ROSS: Sponsored means to somehow convey 
16 to the consuming public that you are giving an endorsement 
i. 17 to this product or that you approve it. 
18 And our claim is that the way Google goes 
19 about this, the people surfing online are under the 
20 misimpression that Rosetta stone is sponsored -- is the 
21 sponsor of those sponsored link. We think they 
22 deliberately used that word sponsored link for the 
23 purpose. 
t. 24 THE COURT, Well, you know, in another 
25 context, a sponsor is someone who pays money for permanent 
RENBCIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, eRR 
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1 display. For example, a charitable activity, a sponsor is 
2 listed as a sponsor of the X, Y, Z Ball. That does not 
3 necessarily suggest that the organization has adopted the 
4 sponsor, does. it? 
5 MR. ROSS: No, it doesn't. You're 
6 absolutely right, Your Honor, and remember this is a 
7 l2{b) (5) motion and so 
8 THE COURT, Yeah, the issue is -- the test 
9 is one of plausibility. 
lO MR. ROSS: Yes. Your Honor. That's 
II absolutely right, under Twombly. Let me put it this way. 
12 There are specific academic studies out there that say in 
13 the context of the Internet, common users perceive that to 
14 mean, sponsored i ink to mean that their search for a 
15 specific company, Rosetta Stone. 
16 You know, this all starts when you the 
17 searcher put in the term Rosetta Stone. You don't put in 
18· language software. We wouldn't be here complaining . 
19 You punched Rosetta Stone. In your mind 
20 you're thinking I'm going to get results to tell me how to 
21 get there. You punch in Rosetta Stone and you get - the t op 
22 of the page, the sponsored link . 
23 All the academic studies show that people 
24 commonly think that that means Rosetta Stone sponsored 
25 that. And so it's a little bit different where in a 
RENECIA A. SMITH - i<lILSON. RMR . CRR 
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1 football. you know. college bowl se.ies, year afte. year 
2 we all know that when they say the Tortilla Doritos Fiesta 
3 Bowl, we know what sponsored means there. It's different 
4 here. Now, if I may add one other point. I know you've" 
5 been bere very long time this morning. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: This is honest government work. 
7 MR. ROSS, Yes. it is. Thank you. 
8 Their argument sort of morphed the opening 
j' 9 brief that Ms. Carusq admitted, and t heyfre no longer 
10 arguing about competition. Th~ylre saying tha~ we 
11 didn't -- they didn't put there name Rosetta Stone en 
12 their products. And that 'S just not required in the 
13 Lanham Act and the words of the Lanham Act answer this 
14 question direct.1y . 
15 So, if r may- just read to you from Title 15 
l, 
16 of the United States code Section 1125(a) , if you'd bear 
17 with me, the words are right here. 
18 It says "any person who, or in connection 
19 with any goods or services or containers for goods· uses · in 
20 commerce. any word. term, name, symbol, device. any 
21 combination thereof!! 
i 22 THE COURT: Slow down. slow down. The court 
l < 
reporter'S got ·to take this down. 23 
i ' 
i 24 MR . ROSS: I'm so sorry. 
25 THE COURT, And I can't even think as fast 
RENECIA A . SfJIlTH-"lILSON. RMR, CRR 
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1 as you can talk . 
2 MR. ROSS, She is actually very fast. She's 
3 very good. 
4 So, false or misleading representation of 
5 fact which, in commerc~al advertising, what they do 
6 umisrepresents the nature, characteristics . qualities or 
7 geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods 
8 or services". Another person's goods or services. 
9 The notion that the false endorsement has to 
10 be on a Google product is directly belied by the words of 
Ll the statute. We donft need a case for that because the 
12 statute says Google can put our name falsely endorsing 
13 some other person's goods, and that 's a clause of action. 
14 THE COURT, All right. I've asked you the 
15 questions that I have. Thank you very much. 
16 MS. CARUSO, Thank you, Your Honor. I'll 
17 pick up right where Mr. Ross lef t off with t he language of 
18 the Lanham Act. And the portion he was reading of the 
19 Lanham Act is not the portion that controls her~_ That's 
20 the preamble t hat gets to where the Lanham Act lays out 
21 what the claims can be . 
22 Arid. Lhere if again -- the language is a 
23 little cumbersome, but I'll read it for the record_ 
THE COURT , Slowly. 24 
25 MS. CARUSO, Yes. To state this type of 
RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, eRR 
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1· claim under Lanham Act, the allegation has to be t.hat "the 
2 use of the word, term or trademark is likely to cause 
3 confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or 
4 association of such person l! and that means the one alleged 
5 to have used the false designation of origin here , the 
6 defendant, "with another personu , which the case law tells 
7 us is the plaintiff, "or as to the origins I sponsorship or 
, . 
8 approval of his or her" I the defendant r S "goods • services 
9 or commercial activities by another person II I the 
10 plaintiff. 
11 And what's important, Your Honor, because 
~2 it ' s not immediately apparently maybe the first time you 
13 look at it, this by-another-person language. Uniformly, 
14 the case law tells us that that is the plaintif E. 
i 15 The cases that the defendant -- the Rosetta 
t , 
16 Stone cites all say the defendant, the defendant's goods. 
I· 
l 17 It has to be confusion as to the plaintiff's endorsement 
18 of the defendant's goods . 
19 And, Rosetta Stone has not offered any case 
20 that is to the contrary. It's just not simply what the 
21 law is. 
l 22 I ' d like to go back to the forum selection 
23 clause because I think that really moots this issue. 
24 First of all, the language about - - in the 
25 preamble that these terms govern the customer's 
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1 participation, this language, we don't need to shy away 
2 from it in any way. It -- these terms are the 
3 requirements. They're the rules under which the customer 
4 has to agree to participate in Google's programs. 
5 The customer could separately -- it could 
6 choose not to be a customer and not to advertise to the 
7 AdWords program and separately bring this case. That's 
8 true. 
9 That's not what they did. They agreed to 
10 play it by these rules, the rules in which they agreed to 
11 bring any claim relating to Google advertising programs in 
12 California . 
13 And one of the cases that they cite even 
14 makes t his point : It says that what is the Transfirst 
15 case. 
16 It points out in a forum selection clause 
17 that the plaintiff 's claims relate to their employment 
18 agreements but t hey would exist independently of those 
19 employment agreements. 
20 But, given the language of that forum 
21 selection clause, it covers those claims, even though they 
22 could have been brought in the absence of a contractual 
23 relationship. 
24 And, what's important here is that there is 
25 this contractua l relationship. And, it's not necessary 
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1 that the claims to be brought in California relate to the 
2 contractual relationship. 
3 And again, going back to the language of the 
4 contract, this is clear . So, the forum selection clause-
5 says all claims, not just arising out of but relating to 
6 this agreement. 
7 So, if you just stopped right there, already 
B you have enough language to see that Rosetta Stone's 
9 argument is not correct, that their interPretation of 
10 the -- of Google programs would add anything else because 
11 tort claims that r elate to this agreement would clearly be 
12 covered by it. 
13 So, the lIor Google programs" has to add 
14 something. 
15 THE COURT, All right. 
16 MS. CARUSO, And they don't identify or fill 
17 us in with what that might be. 
18 In addition, I think it's worth pointing out 
19 that the terms of -- the advertising program terms aren't 
20 just limited to what's necessary for Rosetta Stone to 
21 advertise on the Adwords program. 
I 22 In paragraph four, section B, i t specifies 
10 
23 "that ~he custome r shall not use any automated means or 
24 form of scraping or data extraction to access, query or 
25 otherwise collect Google ' s advertising related information 
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1 from any program, website or property. 
2 So whatever ability Rosetta Stone had to d o 
3 that, technically or lawfully otherwise, they've now 
4 agreed, just like theY've agreed to bring any claims 
5 relating to the program in California, not to do that. 
6 So, these program terms are all required, do 
7 govern the conditions of Rosetta Stone's participation, 
8 but theY're not limited just to that advertising 
9 relationship. 
10 
n 
THE COURT, Thank you very much. 
MS. CARUSO: You're welcome, Your Honor. If 
12 you would like to hear more about the CDA, I can talk 
13 about that. 
14 THE COURT, I'm trying to be polite. Nhen I 
15 say thank you very much, that means that I t hink I 
16 understand your position. 
17 
18 
19 
MS. CARUSO, Okay . 
The 
THE COURT, In California, that -- in 
20 Virginia, that means the judge has heard enough. 
21 
22 Honor . 
23 
24 
MS._ c..2\RUSO: Thank you very much, Your 
THE COURT, Thank you. 
This matter is before the Court on the 
25 defendant's motion to dismiss. And the parties have 
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1 properly briefed the matter, and there are , I think, three 
2 critical issues, and the first that has to be decided at 
3 che outset is whether or not this lawsuit belongs in 
4 virginia under the forum selection clause of the Ad~/ords· 
5 contract submitted by Google. 
6 And, of course, such clauses are enforceable 
7 under Virginia law and federal law . And what we're 
8 dealing with here is terms that are set forth in the 
9 AdWords program contract in paragraph nine. 
10 And both parties .have briefed the matter . 
11 So, I h~ve to, as I am supposed to, determine if the 
12 clause is clearly communicated to the other side, whether 
13 it's mandatory permissive. whether the claims involved are 
14 subject to the . clause, and whether the resisting party has 
15 rebutted the presumption of enforceability under the 
·16 Phillips versus Audio Active case. 
17 Obviously, the first and the second are" met 
18 because the clause is obvious and it is, I think, a 
19 mandatory clause. And it was communicated electronically 
20 to the Rosetta Stone's marketing manager . 
21 And as it relaLes to the issue of whether or 
22 not the claims are subject to forum selection clause, I 
23 hold that they are not, because none of the claims concern 
24 Rosetta Stone's participation in Google ' g advertising 
2S programs. 
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1 Three of t he c laims concern Virginia 
2 business law, and five are based on the Lanham Act, 
3 Obviously, the Yahoo case from the Fifth 
4 Circuit is not controlling. But in that case , the Fifth· 
S Circuit upheld District Court's judgment to not enforce a 
6 forum selection clause because the clause in that case 
7 required American Airli~es to submit claims to California 
B forums and claims brought by Yahoo against it and the 
9 clause is ambiguous. And the claims between American 
10 Airlines and Yahoo arose out of'different circumstances. 
11 Here ~lhat l<ole' re dealing with is a trademark 
12 infringement claim that could have been brought 
13 notwithstandi ng the contract. The cause of aC,tion do not 
14 turn on the contractual relationship between Google and 
15 Rosetta Stone. 
16 The claims arguably turn on Google's 
17 relationship with other advertisers, that is to say the 
18 relationship that Google has with other advertisers who 
19 are being presented on the website as sponsored links. 
20 And if that ' s an independent relationship between Google 
21 and Rosetta Stone, obviously, the faces would be different 
22 if Rosetta Stone brought a breach of contract claim which 
23 would require 'interpretation of the AdWords contracts. 
24 So, because the claims are not subject to 
25 forum selection clause, I'm going to deny the motion to 
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1 dismiss as it relates to the forum selection clause. 
2 That brings us to the Ealse representation 
3 claim under 12(b) (6). Obviously , I ' m applying Bell 
4 Atlantic versus Twombly and Ashcroft versus Iqbal. And it 
5 seems to me that I'm going to grant the mo tion to dismiss 
6 as it relates to the false r~presentation of the so-called 
7 false endorsement claim because the plaintiff here has not 
8 suEEiciently asserted that there is a likelihood of 
9 consumer confusion as to the origin, approval or 
10 endorsement of t.he product unde;:r the Comins - - and Comins 
11 is C-O-M-I-N-S versus Discovery Communication case. 
12 And I ·think that a false endorsemen.t claim 
13 can be viable even if the parties are not competitors 
14 under the Holland versus Psychological Assessment case. 
15 But what we -have here is a failure to, I 
16 think. sufficiently set forch a likelihood of confus i on as 
17 it is required in the Fourth Circuit under the Synergistic 
18 case. And Synergistic is spelled S-Y- N- E-G-I-S-T-I-C 
19 case, Fourth Circuit, 2006. 
20 Focusing on the seventh factor which is 
21 actual confusion, ~lhile the plaintiff seLS forth 
t 22 background about the information on the Internet. Google 
! 
l~'; 
23 search Engine being based on ke~~ord "advertisingn , I do 
! 24 not think that they sufficiently set forth a showing that 
25 would demonstrate confusion by web users or confusion by 
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1 web users that would allow .feb users to think that 
2 sponsored link means that Rosetta Stone somehow endorses 
3 the link. 
4 I think Lhat it has -- sponsored links means 
5 arguably paid ads, not necessarily ads paid by or approved 
6 or endorsed by Rosetta stone. And obviously, I give 
7 Rosetta Stone a chance to revisit if they want to replead 
8 that. But I'm going to grant the motion as it relates to 
9 the f alse endorsement claim. 
10 As it relates to the issue of whether the 
11 conspiracy claim is encompassed in the immunity afforded 
12 by the communications Decency Act. depending upon the 
13 status of Google. I think that Google is an interactive 
14 computer service provider . ~~d there's no indication here 
15 that Google creates the contents of the ads. 
16 I understand the theory about the banners 
17 and the headings . And I think my Neiman Ford -- Neiman 
18 Chevrolet case address something about the banners and 
19 headings. But in any event, I do not think that is 
20 sufficient to plead that Google . vrould fall outside the 
21 Communications Decency Actls immunity. 
22 Rosetta Stone has cited to the Fair Housing 
23 Council of San Fernando Valley case, and I think that that 
24 case is distinguishable in about three ways. 
25 First, the Roommates.com requires an 
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1 interested member · to complete a questionnaire. Second, 
2 Roommates.com sends out e-mails containing member's 
3 profile to other members; and third, information provided 
4 by Roommates.com members in a comment box are displayed 
5 for others to view. 
6 In that case, the Court found that 
7 Roommates. com is an information c.ontent provider because 
8 as to the contents of the questionnaire and the e-mail 
9 distribution, its content ads formula.ted by Roommates. 
10 Here, Google is qisplaying its sponsored 
11 links based upon the web user query. And a web user has 
12 to decide to use Google. It's open. It's the marketplace 
13 on the web. It's not the only game in town. Obviously 
14 there is Yahoo and Bing, B-I-N-G and others. 
15 So, l:he displaying of a formatted 
16 advertising is passive. It's not the same as sending out 
17 e-mails and soliciting private information which is shared 
18 with others. And similarly the BOO-JR Cigar case is 
19 distinguishable in at least two ways. 
20 First the Court did not determine whether 
21 the defendant's conduct made it an information content 
22 provider. Rather it found that the defendant does not 
23 qualify as an interactive computer service provider. 
24 And second, the Court held that immunity was 
25 inapplicable because the alleged fraud is use of the 
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